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ABSTRACT
The United States and the European Union have taken very different approaches in
dealing with tender offers, especially in respect to the amount of power the board of directors has
to block an unwanted takeover attempt. The United States has no single set of guiding principles
regarding most of substantive corporate law and the field of tender offers is no different. The
European Union, on the other hand, has very recently passed legislation that not only attempts to
harmonize the corporate takeover laws of all its member states, but seeks to restrict the power of
the board of directors. The European Union passed the 13th Directive on Takeovers after much
debate and previous failure. Although the European Union required its member states to
implement this legislation by May of 2006, only a handful of nations have actually met this goal,
leaving the true effectiveness of this harmonization effort in doubt. This paper analyzes not only
these different approaches of regulating corporate takeovers and the tender offer process, but also
explores alternative theories of governance in order to better understand how we got to where we
are and to best predict where we are headed in the future.
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Perspective defines corporate reality, at least it does when looking at the respective
powers of the board of directors and shareholders in hostile tender offers. Europe and the United
States view takeover law and hostile takeovers from entirely different perspectives, which has
lead to divergent laws and corporate powers. Corporate law in the U.S. is state law.1 True to
federalist principles and competitive roots, each state has its own set of corporate laws, enacted
to draw corporations to incorporate in its state. In this battle for business, Delaware has emerged
the current winner and is the focus of the majority of corporate law studies. Importantly, in this
struggle for corporate business, the grand effect has been to increase the power of the corporate
boards of directors, especially in the realm of defenses to hostile takeovers.2
The European Union, on the other hand, has brought sovereign nations together and
focused on the harmonization of national laws.3 True to this effort to harmonize, the E.U. has
focused on defining a single set of underlying principles to guide its members when writing
takeover law in their own countries. It is not a battling system of laws, but a unified set of core
values which the states will use to legislate from. This system seeks not only to create a
balanced playing field for shareholders, but it rejects the U.S. precedent of nearly unrestricted
board power to defend against a hostile takeover. However, because the E.U.’s Takeover
Directive is only in its infancy, it is yet to be seen whether or not its implementation will match
its goals to reality.

The Tender Offer and the Defense: What are we talking about?
1

Christin Forstinger, Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, 17 (2002).
See Harry Hutchinson, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the
Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1111, 1149 (2005). See Also: Lucian Bebchuck, “A New
Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition,” 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 132 (2001)
3
See Forstinger, supra note 1, at 48.
2

4

Essentially, a tender offer is an offer to the shareholders of a corporation to buy a
specified number of shares (have the shareholders “tender” their shares) for a premium value.4
These offers are open for a specified period of time and usually require that a minimum number
of shares be tendered for the purchase to go through. Although originating as a way for the
corporation to buy back its stock, it has developed into a powerful corporate takeover tactic,5
which has led to a heated debate regarding the proper powers and roles of the board of directors
and the shareholders in a transaction that will cause a change of control.
Tender offers, as discussed here, are hostile efforts to takeover a company. Boards of
Directors have fought against these hostile tender offers by effectuating a variety of defensive
measures including selling off assets, making a counter bid for the hostile acquirer (Pac-Man
Defense), and seeking out a more attractive acquirer (White Knight). We will focus here on the
most effective and debated defensive weapon, the “shareholder rights plan”, also lovingly known
as the “poison pill.”6
The poison pill refers to a variety of board measures, the most popular being the “flip-in”
measure which gives the shareholders the ability to redeem an option to buy company stock at a
very low price, or even at no cost, based upon a “triggering event.”7 It prevents takeovers by
threatening to severely dilute the value of the stock (making it financially unviable for the
purchaser) and by obligating the acquiror to use the acquired company funds to pay huge
amounts money to the shareholders instead of using that money to repay the takeover financing.8
These pills also allow the target board management to redeem the pill, or effectively negate the
4

The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1250, 1251-1252 (1973).
5
Id.
6
Lucian Bebchuk, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 118 (2001);
See also Herlihy, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2005, 1528 PLI/Corp 341, 397
7
Julain Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 Emory L.J. 849, 856-868 (2004): Here, the triggering
event would be the hostile acquisition of a certain percentage of common stock.
8
See Takeover Law and Practice 2005, supra note 6, at 398.
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option, so that the transaction can go through, which in theory is forces the acquirer to deal with
the board instead of making a hostile bid.9 Most of the current litigation in this area concerns
which situations, if any, require a board to redeem the poison pill to allow a takeover attempt. 10
As of 2005, over 2,300 companies had adopted a poison pill.11
The poison pill’s inventor, Martin Lipton, argues that he created these measures in order
to protect corporations from abusive takeover practices and inadequate bids. He created these
measures to increase the board’s bargaining position, to protect shareholder investment by
preventing corporate raiders, and to increase the takeover premium.12 However, Lipton’s
nemesis, Ronald Gilson, argues that Lipton’s invention does not serve its purposes and is instead
an abuse of management power to the detriment of the shareholder.13
Further, boards have used staggered board arrangements in conjunction with Lipton’s
poison pill, which adds even more bite to this defensive tactic. In theory, a hostile acquiror can
overcome a poison pill by waging a proxy contest to oust the defending board and replace it with
a board that will redeem the poison pill.14 In reality, however, the staggered board entrenches
existing management against such a tactic.15 A bidder would have to wait through multiple
voting periods since the only a small number of seats are contestable in any give period, which
gives the management a veto right over a takeover through numerous election cycles.16 The

9

Id.
Id. at 399.
11
Id. at 397.
12
Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037 (2002); See also Martin Lipton, Pills,
Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Ronald Gilson, 27 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 10 (2002).
13
Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 819, 845-860 (1981).
14
Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 Yale L.J. 621, 627 (2003).
15
Id.
16
Lucian Bebchuk, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 121 (2001).
10
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effectiveness of this defensive duo against acquisition is evidenced by the fact that there are no
reported cases of successful acquisitions where the board had a poison pill in place.17

The Fight Card: The Battle of Interests and the Conflict of Laws18
In this debate over allocation of power, there is a clear line between those who feel the
board of directors, consistent with its corporate governance role, should have almost unrestricted
power to choose to accept or defend against a hostile takeover,19 and those who feel the
shareholders should have the ultimate power to choose whether or not to tender their shares
without board interference.20 Since current law allows for broad use of defensive powers, it is
the critics of these powers who bring this debate, and do so most fiercely in respect to an
arguably “obvious and inherent conflict of interest.”21 Critics argue that although a tender offer
allows a shareholder to sell his or her stock at a price above the current market value, it also can
result in the forced removal of the current board of directors, who naturally would like to remain
in power.22 Further, the board can use its entrenched position to gain advantages, which it would
not share with the shareholders.23
In the U.S., states have given broad deference to the board of directors when it comes to
who gets to decide the corporation’s fate in a hostile tender offer.24 Critics of this power argue
that this is not an accident, but the result of states seeking to maximize the number of
17

Id.
This section focuses on the theories and arguments of the critics of board deference in applying defenses to
takeovers. This is not an argument that these theories are correct. I present first because they are the attacks against
what is existing law. There are compelling counters to these arguments, which I present later in this paper.
19
Herzel, Schmidt, & Davis. Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 Corp. L. Rev. 107
(1980).
20
Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005).
21
See A Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 13, at 819-820.
22
Id.
23
See A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, supra note 16, at 121. Examples of these
benefits would be like those in Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1986) such as
“Golden Parachutes,” which are bonuses, jobs, and other benefits conferred on the defending board by the acquiror
in exchange for their cooperation and redemption of any poison pill.
24
Id. at 132-133.
18
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corporations which charter and reincorporate within its borders.25 Indeed, these critics cite the
adoption of anti-takeover statutes in nearly every state as indicating the desire to provide
protection to the incumbent management.26 The theory goes that managers want to keep their
jobs and the benefits that come with it, which they can ensure by choosing a state that provides
the most obstruction to hostile takeovers.27
The internal affairs doctrine underlies U.S. corporate law and provides that corporations
are governed by the laws of the state in which they are incorporated, such that other states must
defer to the substantive law of the corporation’s jurisdiction.28 This doctrine and the desire to
draw more corporations into the state has arguably created a “race to the bottom,” which is
defined as the lessening of shareholder rights and the elevating board powers in order to attract
more corporate business into the state. Alternatively, some argue that this competition for
corporate business has not and will not create a race to the bottom, but will instead lead to a
“race to the top,” where shareholders will choose not to invest in corporations incorporated under
unfavorable laws, and which will thus induce states to maximize laws benefiting the
shareholder.29 Regardless of who wins this debate, the fact remains that current state laws in the
U.S. defer to the board over the shareholders in deciding when to implement takeover defenses.
The E.U., however, takes the alternate view and seeks to elevate the interests of the
shareholders by forcing board neutrality in a manner consistent with the United Kingdom’s City
Code, which actually inspired much of the E.U.’s 13th Directive on Takeovers (“the

25

Id.
See A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, supra note 16 at 129.
27
Id.
28
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA , supra note 1, at 22.
29
Edhud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908,
1909 (1998).
26
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Directive”).30 Article 9 of the Directive presents the clearest departure from U.S. takeover
practices as it prevents the board of directors from enacting post-bid defensive measures and
requires it to remain neutral and not act to frustrate the bid.31 The effectiveness of this effort to
keep the board neutral and less like the U.S. model of strong board anti-takeover powers,
however, relies on the degree of implementation of the Directive’s principles by the individual
member states.32
Contrary to the internal affairs doctrine dominant in the U.S., the E.U. seeks
harmonization and not competition of different jurisdictional laws, a goal mandated by the
European Community Treaty and its policy of creating a common market.33 The E.U. is
currently seeking to draw its members away from the application the European equivalent of the
internal affairs doctrine, the Incorporation Theory, which would arguably create a “European
Delaware Syndrome” by creating competition among the member states to introduce more
permissive corporate law.34 The counter to this permissive theory is the Real Seat doctrine,
which provides that the country whose laws govern the corporation is the law of the country
where a corporation has its head office, or “real seat,” and not simply where it incorporates. 35
This doctrine restricts the movement of corporations to find more permissive laws, because
although a corporation could in theory still change the jurisdictional law that governs it, doing so
is unlikely because of practicality and substantial costs.36 Thus, the Real Seat theory arguably
prevents the Delaware syndrome and a race to the bottom by keeping corporations in place and
30

General Principle VI and Rule 38 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers state that during an offer or before
an imminent offer the management cannot take measures to frustrate that offer; See also Takeover Law in the EU
and the USA, supra note 1, at 121.
31
EU Takeover Directive Art. III, 1(c) and Art. 11 (2003). Section The City Code of the United Kingdom also has
this same requirement of board neutrality to tender offers .
32
EU Takeover Directive Art. 12 (2003).
33
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 25-30.
34
Id. at 36-38.
35
Id. at 38-40
36
Id.

9

making it difficult for them to change locations for the purposes of operating under less
restrictive laws.37

II. THE UNITED STATES
Corporate Law is State Law: Delaware Reigns Supreme
In the United States, corporate law is state law and Delaware leads the field,38 and under
that law the board of directors has vast authority to manage the affairs of the corporation and to
block hostile tender offers. Delaware is “the” place to incorporate based on its experienced
judiciary, its commitment to meet the needs of its corporate customers and the indeterminacy of
its law.39 Indeterminacy makes Delaware law incompatible with rival state laws, even those
similar to Delaware law, which keeps the benefits of incorporating in Delaware away from
outsiders.40 Indeterminacy can increase the costs of doing business and thereby lessen the
attractiveness of the laws, however Delaware’s learned and concentrated judiciary keeps these
costs low, an advantage absent in states whose laws compare to Delaware’s but whose judiciary
does not. 41 Delaware recognizes this ability of its judiciary to keep the costs of indeterminacy
low, which has led the state to further invest in it.42 Lastly, the incompatibility with other state
laws that Delaware’s indeterminacy brings makes it expense for corporations to leave the state,
thereby keeping corporations in the state lest they have to deal with entirely different laws or at
least a judiciary less capable of handling corporate issues.43

37

Id.
See A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate Law, supra note 29, at 1909: Delaware has
attracted over half of the large publicly traded corporations.
39
Id. at 1909-1913.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1927.
42
Id. at 1928
43
Id.
38
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Although state law currently runs the show, the federal government, true to form, has
refused to be left completely out of the regulation game. The Federal government entered the
arena in 1968 when it enacted the Williams Act to regulate dramatic increases in the use of cash
tender offers and to protect shareholders in what was at the time a very secretive and abused
process of corporate control change.44 The Williams Act added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f)
to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.45 Most importantly, these sections added disclosure
requirements for the bidding entity as well as time and price limitations. For instance, sections
13(d) and 14(d) mandate disclosure of bidder identity and information to the company and
shareholders and requires that such information be filed with the SEC after a beneficial owner
gains more than a five percent hold of the company stock.46 These provisions apply only to
certain companies.47 Further, the Act sought to give shareholder not only the best information
possible, but the best price, and adequate time to consider their options. Therefore, an acquirer
must hold all tender offers open for at least 20 days, and if there is any subsequent change in the
offer, the acquirer must hold the offer open for at least 10 days following the change.48 Also, the
Act has a “best price rule,” which states that if a bidder makes any subsequent increase in price,
all tendering shareholders must get that price.49 Although the federal government seeks to
regulate part of the process, it is still state law which governs the substantive tactics50 that have
led to the heated debated regarding the respective powers of management and shareholders.

Statutory Power to the Board: The States Weigh In
44

See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 77.
15 USC § 78m (2002); see also Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1 at 79.
46
15 USC § 78m (d)-(e) (2002); 15 USC §78n (d)-(e) (2002).
47
17 C.F.R. §240.12(g)-1 (1994); 17 C.F.R. §240.12h-3 (1994): These sections only apply to target corporations
which are 1) listed on a national stock exchange, or 2) where the corporation has assets in excess of $10 million and
has 500 or more shareholders of that class of security.
48
17 C.F.R. §240.14e-2 (1994).
49
17 C.F.R. §240.14d-10 (1994).
50
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 76.
45
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Arguably the most significant takeover development during the 1980’s and 90’s was the
development of state takeover laws aimed at providing protection to the local incumbent
boards.51 Starting with Virginia in 1968, 37 states adopted takeover statutes to more thoroughly
regulate the tender offer process than the William Act had.52 The state effort of regulating tender
offers in this first generation of takeover statutes came to an abrupt halt with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Edgar v. Mite Corp, which declared such regulation unconstitutional.53 The
state statutes favored management and barred a tender offer anywhere in the US unless the
requirements of the state statute had been met, which were usually disclosure requirements
similar to the Williams Act.54 Because of the inherent bias to management and the uncertainty as
to how many state statutes may be applicable to any one merger, the SEC and private litigants
attacked these statutes as unconstitutional.
In Mite, Mite Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, initiated a tender offer for a Chicago
based company. Mite followed the disclosure guidelines of the Williams Act but did not follow
the Illinois law, which required certain disclosure and gave the secretary of state a veto power
over unfair takeovers, arguing that the Williams Act preempted any such state regulation.55 The
Court’s problem with the Illinois law was that instead of just regulating the commerce within its
own boarders, the law had “nationwide reach” which required compliance and gave Illinois the
ability to control an offer made to a shareholder regardless of in what state that shareholder
lived.56 The Court held this type of state regulatory statute was unconstitutional it was a direct

51

Matheson and Olson. Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Towards Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1425, 1431 (1991).
52
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 87.
53
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 US 624 (1982).
54
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 88; See also Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs, supra note 51, at 1439.
55
Mite, 457 US at 626-630.
56
Id. at 643.
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burden on interstate commerce (Congress’ domain) and because it frustrated the intent of the
Williams Act and was a direct burden on interstate commerce.57
Following this decision, state legislatures went to work again and enacted the next
generation of takeover statutes: control share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, cash-out
statutes, and business combination statutes.58
Control share acquisition statutes prohibit an acquirer of a certain percentage of stock
from voting those shares unless a majority of disinterested shareholders grant the acquiror voting
rights.59 These have the effect imposing significant barriers to a potential acquiror because they
may be left with an expensive block of shares that they are unable to make any use of.60
Fair price statutes addressed a two-tiered offer which can cause shareholders to feel
coerced into tendering their stock in fear of if they hold out and the bid is successful, the acquiror
will offer a very low price for their shares in the second-tier.61 The statutes generally require that
the bidder pay a fair price for any non-tendered shares to ensure the price is as fair in the secondtier as it was in the first tier.62 Further, if the fair price requirements are not met, statutes like
that of Maryland subject the bidder to the requirement of getting 80% shareholder approval and
two-thirds disinterested shareholder approval of any second tier merger.63 Although they do help
to stem some of the coercion in a tender offer, these statutes have not adequately addressed
“abusive partial bids.”64
Cash-out statutes, like fair-price statutes, require that an acquiror who has obtained a
controlling interest in a company, upon request by a non-tendering shareholder, buy the
57

Id. at 640.
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1 at 89.
59
See Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs, supra note 51 at 1442.
60
Id. at 1444.
61
Id. at 1445.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1446.
58
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outstanding stock at a fair price, forcing the acquiror to buy the stock still outstanding after the
tender offer at the price offered during the tender offer.65
Business combination statutes impose a moratorium on specified transactions between
the target and a shareholder with a certain amount of stock unless the board of directors approves
the stock acquisition or the transaction prior to the shareholder obtaining a certain percentage of
the company stock.66 These statutes are supposed to help prevent coercive two-tiered takeovers
and “bust up” or dismantling takeovers, by preventing action by the acquiror after a successful
bid.67
It seemed as though these statutes were doomed to the same fate as the first generation
statutes declared unconstitutional in Mite.68 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes.69 In CTS, the court
looked at this new generation of state statutes in a challenge to Indiana’s control share
acquisition law.70 Distinguishing Mite on the basis of that statute’s nationwide blocking power,
Indiana’s law did not frustrate the William’s Act because these statues sought to place the
shareholders on equal footing with the bidder and that the mere delay they caused in an
acquisition was insufficient grounds to find that Williams Act preempted the state law or that the
state law frustrated the purposes of the Act.71
The holding in CTS freed states up to enact more stringent anti-takeover legislation. The
next generation of statues (the third generation) put the poison pill into action, adopted
constituency statutes, and adopted director indemnification statutes to give the board of directors
65

See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 90.
Id. at 1440-1441
67
Id.
68
See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 90.
69
CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69 (1987).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 80 – 87.
66
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more protection and power in defending against a takeover.72 Hotly debated, this third
generation of takeover statutes gives the board of directors an unprecedented arsenal of power
and protection. Constituency statutes, for instance, diverge from the traditional fiduciary duties
of directors to shareholders and allow the board of directors to consider other constituencies
when deciding whether or not to “[unleash] anti-takeover weaponry.”73 Instead of acting to
maximize the welfare of the shareholder, the statutes allow the board to reject the best offer for
the shareholders in favor of an alternative constituent such as a creditor, the neighborhood, etc.74
The board undoubtedly has substantial power under these statutory schemes and those
incorporated under Delaware law are no exception, especially as defined by the Delaware courts.

Power to the Board, Delaware Style
The source of the corporate board’s power comes from state statutes in line with
Delaware’s statute that makes the board of directors the sole decision making authority regarding
the business of the corporation and also from the legal deference paid to those decisions by
courts under the business judgment rule.75 The business judgment rule is rebuttable presumption
that the directors are better equipped to make business decisions and that they acted in good
faith, on an informed basis, and with an honest belief that it was in the best interest of the
corporation.76 Courts respect this presumption absent a showing that the board abused their
discretion in making a decision by being ill-informed or self-interested. 77
72

See Takeover Law in the EU and the USA, supra note 1, at 92-94.
See Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs, supra note 51, at 1449. The Author cites the Minnesota
Corporate Statute as an Example. See Minn.Stat. § 302A.251 subd. 5 (1989): “In discharging the duties of the
position of director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the
corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders
including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.”
74
Id.
75
Del. Gen. Corp. L. §141(a) (1998); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del., 1984)
76
Id.
77
Id.
73
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The Delaware courts have applied this deference to the realm of hostile takeovers and the
board of director’s ability to use defensive tactics. The deference given to the boards in this
situation, however, is not as absolute as the pure business judgment rule. Courts have found it
proper to regulate management actions where there is a management conflict of interest.78 Thus,
Delaware courts have applied an enhanced business judgment rule to contests of corporate
control where it is more tempting for the board to decide an issue in favor of its own interests
rather than those of the shareholders.79 Further, the Delaware courts have defined a line and a
limit of deference between defensive actions to protect the company and defensive actions in
situations where the company is clearly for sale or its break-up is inevitable.80
This enhanced business judgment rule came out of the Delaware Supreme Court decision
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum (“Unocal”).81 Mesa was a minority shareholder in Unocal
and initiated a hostile tender offer to buy Unocal stock, which the Unocal board felt was
insufficient.82 In response, the Unocal board issued a self-tender offer to buy back Unocal stock
at a price above that offered per share by Mesa and excluded Mesa from this offer.83 The board’s
reasoning for this exclusion was that if it in fact bought back Mesa’s shares it would be in
essence financing Mesa’s own inadequate tender offer.84 The board also believed that Mesa’s
financing was inadequate, which would coerce shareholders to tender because Mesa would offer

78

See A Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 13, at 823-825.
See Director Primacy and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 1145.
80
See Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) versus Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1152 (Del.1989).
81
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
82
Id. at 949 - 954
83
Id.
84
Id.
79
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holdouts significantly less after a successful takeover and because Mesa had a reputation of
being a “greenmailer.”85
The Unocal court affirmed the broad powers that §141(a) granted to the board of
directors as the managers of corporate business and affairs and expanded this power to the
board’s authority to protect the corporate entity and shareholders from a reasonably perceived
threat irrespective of its source.86 Because of the threat of self-interest in the takeover context,
however, the court felt that defensive tactic decisions had to be scrutinized under an enhanced
business judgment rule, which requires the board to show that through good faith and reasonable
investigation 1) they reasonably perceived a threat to the corporate entity by another person’s
acquisition of ownership and 2) their response was proportional to the perceived threat.87 This
process for determining whether the business judgment rule applies has been labeled the “Unocal
test.” The court found the Unocal board to have met this enhanced scrutiny because of the nature
and price of Mesa’s offer and its reputation for greenmailing.88
Essentially, the ability of the board to meet its burden under the Unocal test is the “whole
ballgame.”89 The test created a case-by-case or fact sensitive analysis where if the board of
directors carries its burden, the business judgment rule will apply to shield its decision from
judicial intervention.90 But, if the board fails to meet its burden, the court applies much stricter
and almost impassible intrinsic fairness test.91

85

Id.: See also footnote 13 in Unocal: Mesa had a reputation of being a greenmailer, a different form of blackmail,
where a party purposely makes an insufficient offer in order to coax the target company to buy back the potential
acquirer’s stock at a premium to prevent them from taking control of the company with the undervalued tender offer.
86
Id. at 954
87
Id. at 955
88
Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
89
See Director Primacy and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 1146
90
Id.
91
Id.

17

In the same year as Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court also decided Moran v.
Household Intern., Inc. 92 Household adopted a “poison pill” as a preventative measure against
any possible futures takeovers, which allowed for shareholders in the event of a successful
takeover to purchase $200 worth of stock from the acquirer for $100.93 The current board had
the authority to redeem the rights at a very low price.94 The court held that Delaware
Corporations Code §157 allowed a board of directors to deploy a “poison pill” without
shareholder approval in order to prevent a hostile tender offer95 (emphasis added). Further, if
faced with a hostile tender offer and a request to redeem the rights, the company could not
arbitrarily deny the request, but such a denial must be a legitimate and non-conflicted exercise of
board power subject to court scrutiny under Unocal.96
In Revlon, however, the Delaware Court invalidated the defensive action of the Revlon
board and made clear that although broad, the board of director’s authority was not absolute.
There, Pantry Pride initiated a tender offer for Revlon stock, which the Revlon board felt was too
low.97 In response to the initial low tender offer and the subsequent increased Pantry Pride
tender offer bid premiums, Revlon knew that its sale was inevitable and sought out a “white
knight,” Forstmann. Eventually, Revlon granted Forstmann lock-up options98 in Revlon assets,
which effectively ended bidding even though the Pantry Pride bid was higher.99 The Court held
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that this type of situation was different than Unocal.100 Once a company is clearly for sale, the
board has a duty to play auctioneer and to secure the highest price possible for the common
stock.101 Ignoring the duty to the shareholders to maximize the sale price in favor of a deal
which protected the directors from liability to note holders breached the board’s duty of
loyalty.102 Revlon reaffirmed Unocal’s requirements to show reasonable response to a
reasonably perceived threat, but more importantly stated the board’s duty is altered to that of an
auctioneer once change of control or sale is inevitable.103
The Court clarified this standard in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.104 The
court identified two scenarios which invoke the Revlon auctioneer duty: when the board actively
initiates a bidding to sell itself or break-up the company, and also where the board abandons the
company’s long term strategy in favor of a break-up of the company.105 Paramount made a
tender offer to Time, which Time labeled as inadequate based upon the likely merger between
Time and Warner, which would dramatically increase the value of the company.106 The board,
concerned that shareholders would tender, restructured the merger of Warner as a tender offer
and prevented the shareholders from accepting the Paramount offer.107 The Court held that such
Time’s action did not invoke either of the Revlon situations because there was no evidence that
the reworked merger with Warner represented either a decision to sell Time or an effort to breakup the Time.108 The Court found that the defensive response was reasonable to the perceived

100

Id.
Id. at 182
102
Id.
103
See Director Primacy and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 1150-1151.
104
Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
105
Id. at 1150.
106
Id. at 1151-1150.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1151.
101

19

threat and that such action didn’t prevent Paramount from subsequently bidding on the combined
Time-Warner.109
The previous cases lead us to the modern day framework enunciated in Paramount v.
QVC.110 Paramount agreed to merge with Viacom and amended the company’s poison pill to
permit the merger, and also granted Viacom stock lockups and a no-shop promise.111 QVC then
made a tender offer bid, which Viacom countered, which QVC subsequently countered.
Paramount refused to alter its preference for Viacom, calling QVC’s offer illusory.112 The court
restated the Revlon rule and its auctioneer requirements when the company initiates a bidding
process or when its break-up is inevitable, or where there will be a change in control. But, the
court noted that Revlon is not limited to just these two scenarios.113 The court found that this
case fell into the first category because the Paramount board had essentially entered into a
bidding process and thus had a duty to modify its bid with Viacom and negotiate with QVC in
order to get the highest price for the shareholders.114 The court stated that the board has a duty to
protect its Shareholders in a change of control because when a buyout or change of control is
inevitable the shareholders become minority shareholders and lose any meaningful voting
influence.115
Through the preceding cases and Unitrin,116 the Delaware courts have validated the vast
board power to defend against takeovers, and have subjected this power to very few limitations,
such as the bidding or break-up process of Revlon or QVC.
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Recent Bad Behavior: The Federal Hammer and Its Effect on the Future of
Court Deference to the Board
In June 2002, the Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to management
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in order to create and enforce more stringent
management accountability. In doing so Congress may have indeed affected the amount of
deference the Delaware courts are now willing to give to management.117 In a late 2003 article,
an author noted that in every case dealt with by the Delaware courts regarding directorial powers
and duties after Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, the courts had ruled against
management and in favor of shareholder power.118 Another significant occurrence was the
expansion of the Blasius doctrine into the Unocal realm of corporate control and defenses.119
In Blasius, the Delaware court addressed a case where the Atlas board, in response to a
possible future proxy fight with Blasius, expanded the size of board and filled the vacancies in
order to thwart Blasius, not from taking complete control, but from gaining enough board seats
to implement what the Atlas board felt were bad policies.120 The court acted to protect
shareholder voting rights and held that a high standard of scrutiny applies where board actions
have the primary purpose of impairing the shareholding franchise and that the board has the
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burden to show a compelling justification for its conduct.121 Thus, a court can find a violation of
board duties even where the board acted reasonably and in good faith, these requirements being
the same requirements under Unocal that invoke deference under the business judgment rule.122
This is significant because no board has ever met the burden under Blasius.123
In 2003, the Blasius review toppled the board powers and deference in defensive actions
in Liquid Audio124 The Delaware Supreme Court expanded the impassible compelling
justification test beyond actions to change board size to prevent shareholder voting on new
directors, which would not have the effect of an outright change of control, and applied it to the
realm of defensive measures enacted by the board to prevent a change of control by interfering
with the shareholder’s ability to elect directors.125 This case makes a pro-shareholder move and
marks the willingness and ability of the courts to ignore the business judgment rule and apply
their own judgment, arguably to the detriment of corporations and corporate law.126
Scholars argue that this move against board deference is directly related to Congress
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley.127 Delaware courts have historically reacted to and changed its
policies when threatened with federal preemption into historically state regulated corporate
issues and it is argued that this current move is Delaware’s response to Sarbanes-Oxley to avoid
further Congressional meddling.128 This trend may lead away from Unocal, its business
judgment deference, and the policy that absent abuse, management is the more skilled corporate
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decision maker, and may lead to substantive scrutiny of board defensive actions taken in hostile
takeovers.129

The Power Struggle and the Great Debate: Shareholders v. Board
Is all this power a good thing? As stated previously, state law favors incumbent
management in the takeover context providing them with a vast array of tools to fend off
potential acquirors. Proponents of these defensive measures cite the necessary deference to
board business decisions and apply that rationale to the ability to protect shareholders from
insufficient bids, to encourage higher premiums, to protect the shareholders from a distorted
choice of whether or not to tender their shares, and to implement and execute long-term company
goals.130
There are, however, many academics who argue that the legislatures and courts have
gone too far and have given too much deference to the board of directors especially in the
defenses arena where there is such an apparent conflict of interest between the board’s desire to
stay in power and the shareholders desire to maximize their investment.131 Further, they argue
that tender offers are an essential component in maintaining optimal corporate governance.132
Efficient Market Theory
Opponents of the defenses, such as Professor Gilson, argue that the unencumbered tender
offer serves a crucial role in the modern corporate structure. The tender offer serves as a market
check on the performance of management by replacing poor management to increase corporate
performance, which leads to more optimal and proficient management and thereby lends support
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to giving the board deference in other areas.133 Essentially, the threat of a takeover propels the
board to act efficiently and in the best interests of the company and shareholders. Defensive
tactics negate this market check by allowing even the inefficient board the power to entrench
itself, thus negating any incentive to act more efficiently.134 Why work harder if you cannot get
fired? Professor Bebchuk concurs with Gilson stating that a board veto over a tender offer
diminishes the disciplinary force that a takeover threat can exert on incumbents,135 resulting in
poorer management performance, lower profit margins, less return on equity, slower sales
growth, and an overall reduction in firm value.136
Opponents also cite the inconsistency and hypocrisy they find in the board’s fight to keep
their defensive tactics. They argue that the boards cannot play both sides of the regulation
argument, espousing the use of the free market as a check on their bad behavior, but then
advocating a regulated market in order to veto hostile takeovers.137
Supporters of the defenses, however, disagree with the validity of the market theory,138
stating that there simply is no evidence that takeovers actually perform any type of disciplinary
role and that research and real life experience have undermined that argument.139 In fact, they
argue that the poison pill has not reduced takeover activity or reduced any shareholder returns,
citing that since 1985 Delaware merger and acquisition activity has actually increased.140
Further, the supporters draw support for their argument from history, claiming that
defensive devices and in particular the poison pill are necessary tools. In the mid 1980’s
corporations were falling to corporate raiders armed with junk-bonds and singing the efficient
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market theory battle cry.141 Recognizing a threat to corporate welfare and its inability to function
in an environment where there is a permanent “For Sale” sign,142 Martin Lipton created the pill
to allow a target board the ability to control its own destiny and make an informed decision to
remain independent.143 Further, its intent and its result is not an absolute block to corporate
takeovers, but rather it seeks to promote takeovers through the proxy/board replacement process
or a tender offer approved by an informed board.144 Essentially, the pill gives the board
sufficient time (more than the 20 days the Williams Act gives) to carefully consider the bid and
make the informed decision, but does not provide absolute insulation.145
As mentioned previously, however, opponents claim that Lipton’s reliance on the proxy
as an effective means of corporate change of control may in fact be a moot point when a board
couples the poison pill with a staggered board.146 If the only way to prevent the poison pill from
killing a tender offer is to gain control of the board through a proxy contest and redeem the pill,
the staggered board prevents this for a sufficient amount time to make the takeover idea
unappealing to a prospective bidder.147 The interesting point here is that the staggered board,
although arguably a defensive tactic by itself by slowing down the ability of an acquiror to take
control of the board, is more a defense of the poison pill, which makes the staggered board a very
important part of a corporation.148
Supporters of defenses, however, state that the proxy contest is actually easier and more
successful for a party seeking proxies in order to redeem the pill and buy the stock from the
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shareholders at a premium. The likelihood of success increases because its election platform is
much more appealing.149 Instead of the solicitor asking for votes because it will manage the
company better, it asks for the votes so that it can buy the stock at a premium over market
price.150 Yet, it still remains the case that the staggered board requires not one, but at least two
proxy contests in order to overcome the poison pill.151 So, even though in theory there is still the
possibility of successful contests, no bidder has ever actually succeeded in doing so.152
Supporters also argue that the corporation does not exist solely for the benefit of the
shareholder’s short-term gains and that it would be dangerous to force corporations into acting as
if they did.153 Delaware has rejected the efficient market theory for this very reason.154 The
danger of doing so is evident when one looks at the market occurrences over the last two
decades. First, any company under-valued in the 1980’s would have been bought out for a slight
premium, which would have led those companies and their shareholders to miss out on the longterm 1000% increase in stock market value since then.155 More alarming would be a
reoccurrence of the tech-stock bubble of 1999-2000, where a company forced to look only at
short-term gain may have been pressured into allowing a takeover by an extremely overvalued
and doomed company.156 It is these dangers which supporters seek to prevent by allowing
companies to consider long-term goals and to protect shareholders from a short-term gain, which
ends up being an illusion. The Delaware courts have protected corporations from these forces by
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stating that the board “is not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a
short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”157
As a corollary to this argument board supporters claim shareholders should leave the
board alone to manage the company. For the same reasons that the business judgment rule
operates in other arenas, it should operate in the takeover context because management is best
suited, informed, and motivated to evaluate the takeover bid not only for its present value but in
relation to future value of the firm.158 The value of the corporate form is not the ability to raise
money, but the ability to effectively manage a myriad of complex issues and players with an
efficient hierarchical structure.159 “Investor involvement in corporate decision making threatens
to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable; namely, the
centralization of essentially non-reviewable decision making authority in the board of
directors.”160 The counterpoint to this argument leads us into the next area of debate.
Shareholders agree that managers should exercise control over regular business decisions, but
should not exercise that same control over tender offers because self-interest impairs their
judgment.161

Conflict of Interest
Opponents cite the inherent conflict of interest, claiming that managers are not loyal
agents and may act to benefit their own interest, in the face of conflicting shareholder
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interests.162 For example, managers may act to save their jobs,163 reject bids benefiting
shareholders in order to make a deal with a favored acquiror,164 or use the threat of a veto (held
in its poison pill) to extract payments, or so-called golden parachutes, that would benefit
management but would have no benefit, if not cause detriment to the shareholders.165
As for the shareholders, management’s entrenchment behind its use of defensive tactics
arguably decreases the shareholder welfare.166 Tender offers give the shareholders the
opportunity to sell their stock at a premium above the current and arguably true value of the
stock, an opportunity that is arguably inalienable.167 If the board uses its defensive measures, the
shareholder loses out on this opportunity.168
Further, this lost opportunity may indeed create a vicious cycle of market inefficiency
cited by Bebchuk and Gilson. Defensive measures that raise the costs of a tender offer
discourage prospective future bidders for other targets, which will affect the number of bidders
and thereby weakening the utility of the market as a check or managerial monitoring system.169
But, takeover defense supporters refute these assertions in light of the judicial standards
of review and effect defensive tactics have on offers. First, supporters claim that boards cannot
arbitrarily reject tender offers because the Unocal/Unitrin standard requires that the board have
acted reasonably and on an informed basis.170 Also, supporters claim that defensive tactics,
especially the poison pill act to deter inadequate bids and increase the premium offered to
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shareholders.171 By giving the board the defensive powers to screen and veto a bid, it forces the
unsolicited bidder to negotiate, giving the board the power to extract a higher price than initially
offered.172 Moreover, these supporters argue that equity rights are contractual, and that
“shareholders do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids. [Instead], the
shareholders' ability to gain premiums through takeover activity is subject to the good faith
business judgment of the board of directors in structuring defensive tactics.”173
Although there certainly are judicial standards of review, which require the board to act
in an informed and reasonable manner when deciding to defend against a takeover, the
opponents of the defenses argue the insufficiency of the real life effectiveness of such safeguards
against board power.174 In Moran, the court stated that the right to use a poison pill was not
absolute, leaving open room for situations when the board may be required by its fiduciary duties
to redeem the pill and allow the takeover.175 Further, state courts including Delaware and New
York have struck down attempts by the boards to protect the pill by either making them nonredeemable (dead-hand provisions), redeemable only by the current target board (no-hand
provisions), or making it redeemable only after a certain time has passed (slow-hand
provisions).176 Even with these judicial decisions, the Delaware courts have not ordered the
redemption of a pill since the mid 1980’s,177 which leaves the opponents of defensive powers
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questioning the teeth that these review standards actually have,178 and the board power
supporters praising corporations for not abusing their discretion to implement defenses.179
Distorted Choice
Perhaps the only area where there is consensus between the two warring sides is on the
danger of the shareholders distorted choice in responding to a tender offer. The anti-defense side
even concedes (without conceding that the power should actually be given) that protection from
the distorted choice may be valid reason to give defensive power to the board.180 However, the
two sides disagree as to how best handle the danger.
The distorted choice occurs when deciding whether or not to tender shares. The theory
posits that a shareholder will tender her shares, even though the takeover is not in her best
interest because she fears that if the takeover is successful, the post-takeover value of her
untendered shares will be significantly less than the bid price.181 This pressure to tender is
detrimental to the shareholder and the corporation because tendering out of fear instead of
tendering to replace poor or inefficient management is a waste of corporate assets and is contrary
to the idea that takeovers are desirable only when they create efficiency gains.182
The anti-takeover camp argues, for many of the same reasons as argued above against
takeover defenses, that defensive tactics lead to social waste by preventing efficient takeovers,
and fail to prevent the distorted choice.183
One solution to this problem is a essentially a two question tender offer: Does the
shareholder want the tender offer to be successful; and in the event that it is successful does the
178
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shareholder want to tender her shares.184 This solution acts to end the distorted choice because
there is no longer the pressure to tender shares blindly and in fear that the shareholder may suffer
monetarily if the takeover goes through.185 The tender offer would only go through if a majority
of shareholders felt the transaction was beneficial and if that is the case, then even the dissenters
will have their shares bought at the premium value.186 Conversely, if the vote on the takeover
question fails, those who wanted to tender may still get to have their shares bought by the
potential acquiror.187
Supporters of the defenses dislike this alternative for a number of reasons. Most bluntly,
supporters claim the shareholders simply do not have the power to take a separate vote denying
or approving a tender offer.188 The board has the duty and right to make the final decision in all
but a very few areas of corporate governance and shareholders lack authority to strip the board of
its control or even review its decisions.189
A toned down criticism argues that the proper defense against distorted choice lies in the
poison pill and proxy battle.190 Having the shareholder referendum on the tender offer puts that
old “For Sale” sign back on the corporation assuring any potential bidder a vote on the offer and
leaving the target board powerless to do anything else but declare the corporation up for
auction.191 Further, even if the tender offer fails, the board will expend major amounts of
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company resources to protect the business.192 In the end, the supporters argue that the poison pill
is the best method at protecting the company and the shareholders.193

The United States: Directors Win, But the Debate Continues
As it stands, the board of directors under U.S. state law has enormous power to make
business decisions, whether those are everyday decisions or decisions on takeovers. The heated
debate focuses on the balance of power between the board and the shareholders and the board’s
duty to act in the best interest of the shareholders. Although there are those who feel that events
like Enron have brought the tide back toward shareholder power, such a move at this point seems
uncertain. What is certain, however, is that no matter how the tide moves, the debate will
continue.

III. THE EUROPEAN UNION
After almost 30 years of planning, 15 years of debate, and one failed attempt to enact
takeover legislation, in late 2003 the E.U. finally approved a takeover directive.194 Although this
effort has been in the works for some time, this debate does not have the history in the E.U. that
it does in the U.S. Hostile takeovers have historically been so infrequent as to be a non-issue in
the E.U.195 It was not until the same time period that the US began debating the new found
poison pill that the E.U. member states began discussing and implementing national law to deal
with the increasing number of hostile takeovers, most of which mirrored the U.K. City Code and
its pro-shareholder choice/director neutrality model.196 Interestingly, when the E.U. recognized
the need for some sort of multinational takeover regulation, the same divisive and on-going
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debate occurring in the US (encouraging takeovers versus allowing defensive tactics) hindered
its efforts.197
Hostile takeovers are rare in the E.U., 198 however the harmonization of takeover laws is
seen as key to fulfilling the ideal of a common market among the member states199 and
ultimately to challenge U.S. economic and political dominance.200 The underlying objective is to
release companies into the market of corporate control, essentially subscribing to the efficient
market theory, with the expectation that the free market will discipline management and lead to
optimal performance and economic growth.201 The European Takeover Directive is now in its
final stages of implementation. Because of the opt-out provisions, however, which made the
Directive politically viable, but also made important provisions optional, it is yet to be seen
whether or not the Directive will provide the cohesive system it was designed to promote or if its
harmonizing goals will instead remain a fiction among a the diverse web of national law.

The Framework Approach and the E.U.’s Own “Federalist” Issues
The E.U.’s efforts at enacting takeover legislation focus on creating a general set of
principles and basic requirements and not over-encompassing and detailed legislation. This
approach is an effort to respect the national laws and sovereignty of each member, requiring that
they individually enact the detailed law to effectuate the principles and guidelines.202 Thus, the
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harmonization which the E.U. seeks is not an effort at total legislative uniformity,203 but instead a
theoretical and principled uniformity to drive individual national law.
In this regard, the E.U. has a similar structure to that of the U.S. internal affairs doctrine
because corporate law, and takeover law specifically, is the law of the country in which the
company incorporates.204 Although not completely unifying, the Directive goes a lot further in
its attempt to harmonize substantive law than does the Williams Act, which remains primarily
procedural.205 Most illustrative, the Directive seeks to prohibit unauthorized use of the poison
pill and other defensive measures, whereas in the U.S., restrictions or allowances on this front
remain entirely subject to state law.206

The Road to Harmonization – Failed Attempts
In 2001, the European Parliament rejected a proposed multinational takeover Directive,
the 13th Directive on Takeovers.207 Discussed below are the proposal’s history, its elements, and
ultimately its rejection.
The real push towards multinational takeover regulation began in 1985 upon publication
of the “White Paper” by the European Commission, which emphasized the need for cross-border
collaboration in order to achieve the goal of a common market.208 Along side this academic
push, Italian Carlo de Benedetti’s attempt to gain control a very large Belgian holding company,
Société Générale de Belgique, provided a real life catalyst for legislation.209 This takeover
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attempt was a fierce battle which employed a plethora of defensive tactics and revealed the need
for a European regulation to fill an obvious cross-border takeover void.210
Ten years later and after many reworked drafts, the European Council trumpeted the
proposed Directive as essential to making Europe the leading world economy.211 With such high
expectations, the impact of the vote to reject the takeover Directive was “tragic…and a major
set-back to the goal of reaching an integrated capital market.”212 The failure came as a shock
partly because the proposed Directive was only a framework and not mandatory law, giving
leeway to national law and prerogatives in its implementation, and also because the Directive
was based on the U.K. City Code provisions, which many member states were already enforcing
versions of.213
The aim of this failed Directive was to set minimum guidelines for the conduct of
takeover bids, minimum levels of shareholders safeguards, and to create a minimal level of
harmonization between the laws of the many nations.214 Underlying this effort, however, was
the Directive’s fatal rule, board neutrality.215 This rule encourages hostile takeovers by requiring
that the board of the target company to remain neutral in the face of a tender offer and not act to
defeat the offer with defensive tactics unless the shareholders give specific authority to do so
during the offer period.216 This provision prevents the use of U.S. style defenses like the popular
poison pill, allowing defenses only after specific approval during the bid period itself.217
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The fallout from the neutrality rule ended the debate on provisions such as equal
shareholder protection and mandatory bid rules, which arguably would have benefited the
European market and corporate governance, and focused the debated exclusively on the benefits
and detriments of takeovers and whether or not they should be encouraged or discouraged.218
The focus on this element of the Directive resulted in its failure and negated the
economic and other benefits of the Directive. The Directive would have increased much needed
European restructuring by opening up the corporate takeover market, allowing the break-up of
conglomerates in favor of concentration and specialization.219 Further, by offering better
investment and shareholder protection, it would have made the E.U. markets more attractive,
thereby bringing in more foreign investment and venture capital to help the needy technology
sector.220 The absence of such shareholder protection makes the E.U. markets less desirable than
the U.K. or U.S. markets.221
This debate, however, was not an unimportant one. As debated in the U.S., the E.U.
politicians questioned the true effectiveness of the market as a check on corporate efficiency.222
Further, there was great concern that allowing takeovers would bring the perceived less
advantageous elements of the U.S. system across the Atlantic, most notably: the attention on
short-term profits over long-term strategy, the corporate cut-backs, and the ever increasing
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income discrepancy between management and employees.223 Also, the European push to allow
the market forces to act on takeovers developed during the dot.com boom in the U.S. Europe
tried feverishly to join in by enacting the policies that were causing such enormous economic
growth in the U.S.224 Towards the late stages of the failed Directive, however, the dot.com boom
came crashing down, which led many European leaders to question the effectiveness of giving
the shareholders more power in corporate governance and attacked the efficient market idea,
which pushed corporations to focus on short-term gains over long term strategy.225
Germany takes the blame for the ultimate failure of the Directive because of its last
minute withdrawal of approval, which centered on its fear of increased takeovers.226 The
negotiations and the proposed Directive failed because of the German rejection of the E.U.’s
desire to follow the UK’s model of directorial neutrality.227 In the wake of the fiercely fought
takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann by the UK’s Vodafone, even with numerous compromises
in its favor on other regulations, the German government was simply not going to sign onto any
legislation which forced neutrality on the board of directors.228
Germany did not like the idea of what it perceived to be unfair takeover advantages
imbedded in the national laws of other countries, which the Directive would not sufficiently
limit.229 Essentially, there are unique risks associated with cross border acquisitions because of
the possibility that an outside acquiror will act in favor of its home country at the expense of the
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target country and the employees or other stakeholders there.230 What helps to end this type of
“entrepreneurial nationalism” is a system where all companies are equally vulnerable to
takeovers.231 On equal ground, a foreign acquirer’s bias in its operations may lead to lower
performance and deteriorating public support in the host country, which creates the opportunity
for a new entity to acquire the company.232 A flaw in the proposed Directive was the focus on
defensive tactics of boards, but the lack of effective parameters regarding elements of national
corporate structure, such as state retention of special voting rights called “golden shares,” which
restrict the transfer of corporate control and are equally dangerous in causing the above
nationalistic risks.233 In practice, these government holds make companies unappealing to a
hostile bidder looking for control.234

There is discrepancy between the member nations as to

who has these provisions.235
In the years leading up to the proposed Directive, Germany opened itself up to the market
for corporate control on a scale much grander than that of its E.U. partners had done and thus had
more to fear from the “entrepreneurial nationalism” than its neighbors.236 Germany’s late stage
withdrawal of support tied the vote, which caused the measure to fail and provoked widespread
animosity.237
Although the Directive failed, the E.U. commissioners favoring a cohesive takeover
system immediately went back to work. They convened the “Winter Group” to research and
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propose a politically viable and effective takeover regulation, which resulted in a revised and
ultimately adopted 13th Directive, which is discussed in detail below.238

Germany Fills the Void: Delaware Would Be Proud
Historically, Germany signed onto the UK thinking regarding director neutrality in tender
offers, but it changed its mind and while working to defeat the E.U. proposed takeover Directive,
it also began working on its own national law to give German boards of directors the powers
they needed to defend against hostile takeovers.239 Enacted in 2001, Section 33 of the German
Securities and Acquisitions Act directly rejects the E.U. neutrality principle in favor of giving the
boards the power to defend against hostile takeovers.240 But, this mandate does not allow the
U.S. board’s weapon of choice, the poison pill.241 Critics argue that the lack of a poison pill may
be detrimental to German companies because it may leave the boards with no choice but to use
the permitted value-reducing measures, such as selling significant assets, which can ultimately
lead to the “destruction of the firm in order to save it.”242
Section 33(1) allows management to implement limited defensive measures with the
approval of the supervisory board and without first getting shareholder approval, such as the sale
of essential assets or use of authorized capital.243 As stated above these are potentially
destructive and irreversible tactics, yet they do not require shareholder approval.
Section 33(2) adds to the limited powers above by giving the board an alternate source of
authority, the shareholders. This section allows the shareholders at the shareholders meeting to
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grant the board the authority to implement defensive measures prior to any known tender offer,
with such authorization being renewable every 18 months.244
Interestingly, these two grants of power are separate and the shareholder approval
allowance under §33(2) does not restrict the power of the supervisory board to authorize
defensive measures consistent with §33(1).245 Further, the board is not likely to seek shareholder
approval in fear that the shareholders may deny this authority, which leaves the board in a more
precarious position as to what defensive measures it can and cannot legally implement.246
Critics argue that Germany, in enacting this legislation, has participated in a U.S. style
race to the bottom, largely propelled by labor union fears regarding the perceived negative
effects of hostile takeovers on co-determination.247 Although written to give the shareholders a
say in the implementation of defensive tactics, by granting the supervisory board its own
discretionary power, the German takeover law arguably gave the board the deferential power
equivalent to that in the U.S, but absent the shareholder protection that U.S. courts offer248 by
way of Unocal and other fiduciary standards.
This discretion of the supervisory role can essentially be even more profound when
viewed in the context of the make-up of the German two-tiered board structure. As stated
previously, the labor unions lobbied for the defensive powers as a way to protect the workers of
German corporations. Under German law, most corporate supervisory boards are comprised of
one-half labor representatives, leaving only half of the board with directly representing the
shareholders.249 Thus, if the labor representatives oppose a tender offer to protect the worker’s
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rights, even at the detriment of the shareholders and a large premium, they only need one
shareholder representative to agree with them in order to authorize management to take a
defensive action.250
Thus, in the absence of E.U. regulation and in response to their own fears which ended
the viability of the initial 13th Directive, Germany enacted laws completely counter to the
principles espoused in the failed Directive and more inline with U.S. style board defensive
powers. These developments were seen as potentially damaging not only to Germany, but to the
EU as a whole.
First, the German laws restricted the openness of the market for corporate control, which
scholars see as crucial to modernizing EU corporations, ultimately leading to greater E.U.
competitiveness in the global economics and politics.251
Second, by giving such broad defensive powers to the board, but at the same time
disallowing the poison pill, the boards will adopt more self-destructive measures and result in a
takeover system having more detrimental effects than the U.S. system.252 For all the criticism of
the poison pill, it allows a company to staunchly defend against a takeover without obliterating
the corporation in the process.253 Without the pill, corporate boards may resort to the sale of
assets or other alternative and irreversibly harmful errors.254 Also, the German board structure
places a greater emphasis on the stakeholder to the detriment of the shareholder by allowing the
board to ignore the shareholder interests without too much fear of removal.255 In the U.S., even
with takeover discretion, the board is arguably still receptive to shareholder interests, especially
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the large institutional shareholders.256 A U.S. board that ignores these interests and parties is
may face removal in a proxy fight.257 In Germany, this result, though possible, is highly
unlikely.258
In the end, some scholars believed that the 13th Directive’s failure and the German
legislative response meant the end of the effort to enact unifying takeover legislation. Hopeful
voices, however, stated their belief that the animosity towards the German withdrawal and its
national legislation would possibly provide the political momentum needed to pass new takeover
legislation. These individuals argued that the German unilateral protectionist act would show
other nations the pitfalls of not having an E.U. regulation and would thus lessen Germany’s
credibility in tying to garner support to defeat a new E.U. takeover effort.259 To this end,
Germany’s withdraw of support was seen as a positive catalyst to makeover the weaknesses in
the 13th Directive and pass a redrafted E.U. Takeover Directive.260

The Current Legislation – The Good, The Bad, and The Opt-Out Provision
In the wake of the defeated legislation and Germany’s own takeover code, the E.U. was
unwilling to abandon its efforts to enact takeover legislation. A “high level group of corporate
law experts” (a.k.a. the Winter group) was convened to study the unresolved issues surrounding
the 13th Directive’s failure, ultimately endorsing the major provisions of the failed Directive, in
particular Article 9’s board neutrality requirement, and giving the 13th Directive new life.261 The
E.U. passed this revised 13th Directive (“the Directive”) into law on April 21, 2004 and the E.U.
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member nations must implement it by May of 2006.262 In doing so, the E.U. has gone above and
beyond the federal regulations of the US and into the realm of substantive regulation.
The Directive covers a wide range of issues, many of which mirror the Williams Act, for
example, mandatory bid periods, best price rules, and disclosure requirements.263 The key
provisions are covered below: mandatory bids, board neutrality, the breakthrough rule, and the
opt-out provision.
Mandatory Bids, Fair Price, and Minority Shareholder Protection: Article 5
Article 5 requires that where any party (or cooperative group) attains a specified
percentage of shares in a company, the member state must require that party to make a fair bid to
all shareholders, as a means of protecting the minority shareholders.264 An equitable price is the
highest price paid by the acquiror for stock during a time period chosen by the member state, but
which must be within 9-12 months prior to the required bid.265
Importantly, the E.U. has delegated the responsibility of setting the triggering share
percentage to the individual member states.266 This allocation of control to the individual
national legislatures is the result of compromises to allow the individual nation to set percentages
that will work with their own corporate system.267 Although deviating from harmonization, the
different triggering percentages can still cause the same result, based upon whether the individual
member state has a concentrated corporate control system or a dispersed control system because
in a dispersed ownership system the acquirer does not need to acquire such a high percentage of
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stock in order to gain control of a company.268 The opposite is true in a concentrated system
where the company is owned and controlled by a shareholder who holds the vast majority of
outstanding stock.269
The individual nations also regulate the fair price. Article 5 requires that the price be the
highest paid during the transactions to gain control of the company. 270 Thus, if the acquiror
raises his bid for some shares, all shareholders must get that same price for their shares. The
individual nations regulate this by setting the time period for determining the highest price
offered and in extreme circumstances adjust the price in line with principles of equality, such as
when something has interfered with what would be valid market prices.271
The mandatory bid rule does have its ups and downs. First, the rule provides a gain to
minority shareholders because they will get the same premium for their stock as was given in the
control-gaining transaction.272 Further, the rule forces the acquiror to bear the cost of any
negative effect on the price of the stock caused by the acquiror obtaining the triggering
percentage.273 Although the theory is that a bidder will not make a bid unless it is efficient to do
so, the internalization of costs as well as the forced bid requirement, deters bidders from offering
higher premiums or even trying to gain control in the first place, and thus can result in lost
market efficiency.274
This principle of equal price is akin to the “best price rule” under the US Williams Act,
which requires that the acquiror pay all tendering shareholders the highest price paid for the
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shares during the tender offer. 275 Article 5, like the Williams Act, protects minority shareholders
because if the offeror raises his bid, all shareholders, even those that had already tendered get the
higher price. Although, the scenario under the Directive is different because its fair price rule
relates to a mandatory bid procedure, the underlying principle is still the same, the equal
protection of shareholders.
Although the E.U. fair pricing requirement has a counterpart under US law, there is no
counterpart for the mandatory bid, which proponents argue doesn’t matter too much because the
mandatory bid rule simply acts as a defensive mechanism by raising the costs of a tender offer.276
In its best form, the protection and power it offers to an incumbent board does not reach the
levels of protection offered by US Takeover statutes and would thus add nothing to current US
takeover defenses.277
Board Neutrality in Takeovers: Article 9
This Article is the most apparent split between U.S. and E.U. takeover law because it
prohibits the defensive mechanisms so beloved by U.S. boards of directors. As we have seen in
the discussion of U.S. takeover law, the states give the board of directors the power to implement
defensive tactics at their discretion in almost all circumstances and subject only to limited review
by the courts.278 The E.U. on the other hand, embracing the efficient market theory and
mirroring the UK City Code, gives the shareholders the power to decide whether or not to
implement defensive tactics against takeovers.279 Even thought this article caused the German
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withdraw of support and the failure of the proposed 13th Directive, the E.U. drafters retained this
provision.
Article 9 requires that member states enact rules prohibiting the use of defensive actions
to frustrate tender offers from at the latest the time the bid was announced until the result of the
bid is announced or the bid time lapses. During this period the board must obtain shareholder
approval to take action before it can before taking any action other than seeking alternative bids
which may result in the frustration of the bid and in particular before issuing any shares which
may result in a lasting impediment to the offeror in obtaining control.280

Here, the member

states have the ability to extend the period of board neutrality back beyond when the bid was
announced to the time when the board becomes aware the bid was imminent.281
This requirement of neutrality rejects not only the U.S. model for granting the board the
power to act defensively, but also rejects the German model of preauthorization. First, contrary
to the US and the developed case law of Unocal and Moran, the E.U. boards are bound under this
Article to let the shareholders decide the fate of the takeover by voting their proxies. The board
cannot take defensive action unless the shareholders give the board specific authorization to do
so.282 It also rejects use of the poison pill.283 In the U.S., under most state law and in particular
Delaware, the board can enact defenses even in the face of shareholder disapproval as long as
that decisions meets the business judgment requirements of Unocal.284 Second, contrary to the
German law allowing the 18 month renewable authorization given prior to any impending
takeover effort, this Article requires specific shareholder authorization given during the relevant
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time period in order for the board to act.285 The policy underlying this requirement is that the
shareholders should be making the decision to grant authority based upon the relevant
information and not simply giving blind authorization. The language of §3 makes this intention
of informed authorization very clear.286 Decisions made before the beginning of an offer, which
are not yet fully implemented when an offer is made require shareholder approval to continue if
they have ability to upset the bid attempt and are not otherwise part of the normal course of
company business.287
Even though many U.S. scholars would jump at the chance to enact Article 9 neutrality
type legislation in the U.S., it is important to note that the idea of board neutrality has different
consequences in Europe than it would in the U.S. In Europe, because corporate ownership is
concentrated in a few shareholders or a shareholder holding enormous blocks of shares, the
conflict is between controlling and majority shareholders, not management versus shareholders
like the U.S.288 Essentially, putting control of the defensive tactics in the hands of the
shareholders in many corporations in Europe would be pointless because that corporation is
managed by a shareholder who potentially own a majority of the stock and can thus do with the
defensive tactics as they please. Further, unlike in the U.S., where management is checked by a
fiduciary duty to shareholders, there is no equivalent duty for the controlling shareholder to
protect the minority shareholders.289 The checks available to protect minority shareholders are a
unification of minority shareholders to overpower a controlling shareholder, and also publicity in
the sense that the controlling shareholder must publicly announce the use of defensive measures,
285
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which will inevitably draw market attention and forces to ensure legitimate use of the defensive
tactics.290
The Breakthrough Rule: Article 11
The Breakthrough Rule addresses a different kind of defensive mechanism, namely those
actions by the corporation to embed its management such as shareholder agreements limiting the
right to transfer shares, shares with multiple voting rights, and supermajority requirements to
approve post takeover transactions.291 Essentially, a corporation can defend itself by enacting
rules regarding who shares can be transferred to or the number of votes that certain shares carry,
so that they can control the shares or power that a bidder can obtain. Effectively combating the
threats Germany saw in these tactics when it rejected the failed 13th Directive, the intent of this
Article was to limit the ability of management to entrench itself and to equalize the handling of
these tactics, which vary from country to country, to provide equal treatment across Europe.292
The U.S. has no equivalent to this Article and in fact, the U.S. state anti-takeover laws act in
direct conflict with this Article by allowing U.S. companies to enact poison pills.293
Article 11 renders ineffective any restrictions (contractual or in the articles of
incorporation) on share transfers or voting rights once a bid has been made public.294 These
provisions act on two levels.295 First, once a bid is made public, voting rights or transfer
limitations, such as an agreement to offer shares to other shareholders before offering them to a
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third party, are null and void for the period of the bid.296 Second, if the bidder gets more than a
75% controlling stake through the bid, the incumbents or controlling shareholders lose any
special voting rights or requirements, and the bidder can call a shareholders meeting to revise
bylaws and elect a new board.297
This Article exempts Golden Shares and all special rights held by member states in
companies from this Article as long as they are not overly restrictive on the transfer or movement
of investment.298 Even though the Directive allows these rights, however, their validity remains
uncertain. The European Court of Justice has cast doubt on their validity and usefulness and
requires the nation wishing to use them to show a “precisely tailored scheme” to protect a
national interest.299
Opt-Out Provisions and Reciprocity: Article 12
Article 12 is not only the newest addition to the takeover Directive, it is the most
interesting provision of the EU’s effort to regulate takeovers and attempt to harmonize the laws
of the many member nations. In 2002, the Commission introduced Articles 9 and 11, which
caused heated debate and threatened the new Directive with the same fate as the previous failed
13th Directive.300 Late in 2003 however, the nations agreed to the “Portuguese Compromise,”
allowed the enactment of the Directive, but also deteriorated its harmonizing potential.301 Article
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12 made the Article 9 restrictions on defensive tactics and Articles 11 breakthrough rules
optional.302
Essentially, Article 12 allows for three scenarios.303 First, member states can refuse to
adopt the board neutrality and breakthrough provisions, but then must allow companies with its
borders to individually opt-in to Articles 9 and 11.304 This situation is much like the one Lucian
Bebchuk has pushed for in the US. Simply stated, Bebchuk has proposed an alternative to U.S.
state regulation whereby the Federal government would set up a system of regulation focused on
more shareholder power, especially providing a role in defensive tactics, and allow the
shareholders of a corporation to opt into that system, much like the EU companies are allowed to
opt into the Directive even if their government does not.305
The next two scenarios surround the idea of reciprocity, which perhaps act as a check
against uninhibited protectionism and diversity of law. Article 12, §3 sets forth this reciprocity
rule, which states that member states can exempt target companies who apply the defensive
measure rules and/or the breakthrough rules from the requirements of those rules when they are
faced with a bidder who does not apply the rules.306 The company, however, must receive
permission for this exemption from the member state and cannot engage in reciprocity on its own
volition.307 Under the second scenario, the state would adopt Article 9, Article 11, or both, but
exempt companies from following the requirements of those Articles when faced with a foreign
bidder who is not subject to those same requirements because its home jurisdiction did not opt-

302

See Directive, supra note 265, at Article 11.
See The Thirteenth Directive and the Contrasts Between European and US Takeover Regulation, supra note 200,
at 66.
304
Id.
305
See A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, supra note 2.
306
See Directive, supra note 265, at Article 11, §3
307
Id.
303

50

in.308 This leaves the member state with the last two scenarios. It can opt into the requirements,
and allow for reciprocity, or it can opt-in to the requirements and not allow reciprocity. 309
Though, it remains a question, because of international agreements like GATS, whether the
reciprocity clause can be used against nonmember nations like the U.S.310
This opt-out provision has lead to the belief that the Directive is a failure in its attempt to
affect any serious takeover harmonization. European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said that
the Portuguese Compromise took the key ingredient out of the Directive and nullified the EU’s
hopes of becoming the top world economy.311 Indeed some have argued that this provision is
likely to increase national protectionism and end the possibility of harmonization.312 However,
the positive voices say that such pessimism is unwarranted because it overlooks the positive
elements of the Directive, such as the establishment of a common framework for which to
legislate from.313 Further, this Directive forces the nations to confront and address these issues
and to signal a national stance on the critical issue of defensive measures, which can itself help to
build a more harmonized multinational corporate control system.314

Implementation: How It Will Play Out Across Europe?
So, in the end, Europe is ultimately left with a largely optional system of takeover
regulation which the member states were required to implement by May 2006. But how will the
nations implement the Directive and what effect will the implementation actually have? It will
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most certainly take a significant amount of time to see the practical effects of any national
legislation, especially since only five of the twenty-five nations actually met the implementation
deadline.315 However, below is the current stance of a few key nations. From these current
stances it seems as though the legislation will indeed vary, especially in relation to the optional
provisions and reciprocity.

The UK:
The UK has already stated that for it, it will be “business as usual,” seeing how most of
the Directive itself was drawn from their takeover system.316 The UK will opt-in to Article 9,
which is already law under the City Code, but will most likely opt-out of Article 11 and leave
open the opportunity for companies to opt-in because it conflicts with market practice of
allowing irrevocable shareholder agreements not to transfer shares or accept rival offers.317
Further, the UK will not be allowing reciprocity for Article 9 or 11.318 In terms of Article 5, the
mandatory bid rule, the UK will set its trigger at 30% of the voting rights and extend the time
period to determine the fair price to twelve months.319
France:
France, like the UK, will most likely implement Article 9 §2 and §3, which would create
more limited use of takeover methods than current French law allows.320 Currently, absolute
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defenses are prohibited and so is any defense violating the “social interest.”321 However, under
Article 9, many of the accepted defenses will be void. In terms of §3, France has already
changed some its law in order to conform.322 Previously in France, a target board had the
authority to continue implementation of decisions during a takeover bid, which may frustrate the
bid, without further shareholder approval.323 However, recently France suspended this authority
during bid periods, except when, as in line with §3, it is in the ordinary course of business.324
France, unlike the UK is also likely to allow reciprocity for Article 9.325
France will opt out of Article 11, except for the breakthrough transfer restrictions in bylaws during and offer and voting rights caps in by-laws at the first shareholder meeting after a
successful bid, which were already part of French law.326 It is however unclear if France will
apply reciprocity to this Article.
In respect to Article 5, France is likely to set the mandatory bid trigger at 1/3 of the share
capital or voting rights and the equitable price time range will be twelve months.327
Germany:
Germany is unlikely to change much regarding its current takeover law. It will opt-out of
Article 9, and leave it open to corporations to opt-in to on their own, however almost none are
expected to do this.328
It will also opt out of Article 11.329 Much of the restrictions of Article would have no
effect in Germany anyway where a lot of what the Article covers is already prohibited.
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Germany’s only real concern would have been its golden shares in Volkswagen AG, which it
managed to protect from the regulation because of Article 11’s exclusion of state owned
shares.330
Germany will allow reciprocity under Article 9 and 11 and like the UK has set the trigger
for mandatory bid at 30% of voting rights, but has set the time period for the fair price at 6
months.331

IV. Conclusion
The U.S. and the E.U. have very different approaches to tender offers, not only in the
substantive regulations regarding the power dynamic between shareholders and the board of
directors, but in their overall policy goals and legislative structure. The U.S. system developed
out of a competitive federalist system, with the states running the show and the Federal
government only regulating the procedural elements. The E.U. on the other hand entered the
regulation arena with the goal of harmonizing the substantive law of many nations. Although,
that effort did not exactly end in a fully harmonized system, it did result in a harmonized
framework of which to legislate from and build on.
There is a lot of debate in the U.S. regarding our current system of board deference in
respect to defensive measures. The U.S. allows the boards of directors to implement these
defensive measures subject almost solely to the check of their own business judgment. The E.U.,
however, was not willing to accept this same approach. Their guideline pushes for a neutral
board and shareholder choice to accept a tender offer or allow the board to enact defensive
measures. Many in the US would champion this guideline as model for the U.S. system to
rebuild on, and perhaps that idea is not such a bad one. Perhaps, it is time in the U.S. to look
330
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towards a more shareholder focused approach to tender offers and allow the shareholders an
unobstructed, undistorted vote on the tender offer. However, there are also those in the U.S. and
E.U. alike, especially in Germany, who see the neutral system as a serious danger to corporate
existence.
In the end, we are left with two completely different structures and but the need to still
work together. As the May implementation deadline has come and gone, it remains to be seen
how the E.U. Directive plays out. Though regardless of what nations implement which
provisions, the debate regarding tender offers and who gets the ultimate power to decide the
defensive issue, will continue to rage on.
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